Does anybody really think?, pt. 2 (Does any body really feel?)

The first part of this blog detailed what I saw as flaws in the methodology and the presentation of the statistics that was the basis of the documentary ‘What British Muslims Really Think.’ In this second part I want to look at what I see as a primary flaw in virtually all discourse regarding the Middle East, and the Muslim diaspora more generally.

What follows is a segment taken from Bruce E. Wexler’s book, ‘Brain and Culture: Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change.’ I present a 1000-word case study describing what it feels like to be an immigrant. From this, I have removed any clue as to race, creed, religion, country of origin, country of destination, and even the period of history to which it relates, in an effort to have you, the reader, insert your own experiences, or those of people that you know and care for, to see if it’s possible to walk a mile in this person’s shoes. I will then relate this content back to the first installment of this blog.

[Name] was 13 years old when [they], [their] parents, and [their] 9-year-old sister left [old country] to emigrate to [new country]. Growing up as part of a [culture] family in [old city] after [traumatic event], [they were] in many ways on the margin of [old country] society and the object of more than a few exclusionary and critical comments by [their] peers. Yet this was [their] only world, external and internal, until [they] and [their] family [travelled to new country]. As [they] explained, “the country of my childhood lives within me with a primacy that is a form of love… It has fed me language, perceptions, sounds, the human kind. It has given me the colours and the furrows of reality, my first loves. The absoluteness of those loves can never be recaptured. No geometry of the landscape, no haze in the air, will live in us as intensely as the landscape that we saw as the first, and to which we gave ourselves wholly, without reservations”. [Name] recalls that, walking around [large city] shortly before leaving, “I burst into tears as I pass a nondescript patch of garden, which, it turns out, holds a bit of myself.” Standing on the [transport to new country], “I feel that my life is ending”. “When the [traditional band] near the [transport to new country] strikes up the [local musical style] of the [national anthem], I am pierced by a youthful sorrow so powerful that I suddenly stop crying and try to hold still against pain. I desperately want time to stop, to hold the [transport] still with the force of my will.” How clearly [they describe] the formative effects of the environment into which [they] happened to be born, the connection between [their] internal and external worlds, and the impossibility – in [their] situation – of keeping the internal world together with the external world by which it was shaped and to which it was matched.

On [their] third night in [new city] [they had] “a nightmare in which I’m drowning in the ocean while my mother and father swim farther and farther away from me. I know, in this dream, what it is to be cast adrift in incomprehensible space; I know what it is to lose one’s mooring. I wake up in the middle of a prolonged scream. The fear is stronger than anything I’ve ever known.” A short while after [they wonder], “what has happened to me in this new world? I don’t know. I don’t see what I’ve seen, don’t comprehend what’s in front of me. I’m not filled with language anymore, and I only have a memory of fullness to anguish me with the knowledge that, in this dark and empty state, I don’t really exist.” Aware when [they] was leaving her [old country] that part of [himself/herself] was being left behind because [they were] losing the external match to [their] internal self, in the [new country] [they feel] loss, discomfort, terror, and confusion when [they are] surrounded by an environment that does not match the inner world [they had] brought with [them].

While those mourning a deceased spouse may feel that part of oneself has died, this transplanted immigrant felt as empty as if [they] no longer existed. When encouraged by those around [them] to try and forget what [they] left behind, [they wonder] “Can I really extract what I’ve been from myself so easily?” When [they attempt] to take in [their] new environment, the requisite internal structures are lacking or the old structures are obstructing. … “The city’s unfocused sprawl, its inchoate spread of one-family houses, doesn’t fall into any grid of mental imagery, and therefore it is a strain to see what is before me. Even on this days when the sun comes out in full blaze and the air has the special transparency of [new country], [it] is a dim world to my eyes, and I walk around it in the static of visual confusion.” When [they look] at others who are farther along than [them] in the adjustment to a new world, [they worry] that even for them “insofar as meaning is interhuman and comes from the thickness of human connections and how richly you are known, these successful immigrants have lost some of their meaning.”

The change in language associated with many immigrations further disrupts the links between the self and others, and between internal neuro-psychological processes and external social processes. Two days after their arrival [Name] and [their] sister are taken to school and given new names […]. After the teacher introduced them to the class, mispronouncing their last name in a way they had never heard before, “we make our way to a bench at the back of the room; nothing much has happened, except a small, seismic mental shift. The twist in our names takes them a tiny distance from us. …Our [old country] names didn’t refer to us; they were us as surely as our eyes or hands. Those new appellations, which we ourselves can’t yet pronounce, are not us … Make us strangers to ourselves.” Their original names were, of course, assigned to them by others. But the assignment of new names after years of hearing the original names in association with themselves, and the internalisation of those names in important neural structures, is no small matter. [Name] quickly learns [new language] but “the words … don’t stand for things in the same unquestioned way they did in my native tongue. …This radical disjoining between word and thing is a desiccating alchemy, draining the world not only of significance, but of its colours, striations, nuances – its very existence. It is a loss of a living connection.

I think this piece eloquently sums up what one might feel in just a normal, or as we seem to be saying these days “economic”, migration, and gives a good base from which to extrapolate what might be the case in a refugee or forced migration (because from a young person’s perspective, any migration is forced).

The case study contains a number of direct quotes from an adult reflecting on their adolescent experience of immigration. Now consider that 33% of the Muslim population was aged 15 years or under in 2011, compared to 19% of the population as a whole. This is likely to have held steady in the intervening four years. Only 4% of the Muslim population is over 65 years, compared to 16% of the overall population.

_85006767_population_distribution_uk_624

The survey that was the basis of this documentary was meant to be a “representative sample.” It’s very hard to get consent to interview children under 16 due to ethical concerns. If such interviews were undertaken (and there is no indication that they were), given that we’ve established that Muslims tend to more conservative views, what is the likelihood that a youth would, with their parents present (because that’s how such an interview would have to take place), go against their parents’ views? But, as I said, there is no reason to believe that such interviews took place. What this means is that the 4% of the Muslim population that is 65+ have had the prevalence of their view statistically doubled because of the way the survey was carried out. It is a truism of aging that one’s views become more conservative as one gets older. Note the difficulty, in the case study, that the author had in translating the language and landscape of childhood into the present realities of a new country. That’s an adolescent, whose brain is still highly plastic (able to change more readily in response to external stimuli), noting these difficulties. The problems would be much more severe, and require numerous coping mechanisms, in older adults. This is culture shock, writ large.

To illustrate even more forcefully what culture shock can do. Immigration is a recognised risk factor in the diagnosis of schizophrenia (McGrath, Saha, Welham, El Saadi, MacCauley & Chant, 2004[1]), and especially in all ethnic minority groups (Fearon, et al., 2006[2]). People living in developing nations are more at risk, as are people living in urban areas. Curiously, though, the risk of schizophrenia increases for the children of immigrants. New immigrants are 2.7 times more likely to develop schizophrenia than the native English population, but the next generation are 4.5 times more likely (Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005[3]). So it may be that environmental factors in the country of origin, or changes in environmental factors between countries, are influential; but that only explains prevalence in new immigrants, not the second generation. So the question then becomes, is this due to integration, or lack thereof? Cantor-Graae and Selten (2005, p. 101) have suggested what they call “social defeat” is a causative factor in subsequent diagnosis of schizophrenia:

Since both migrants and city residents are exposed to high levels of social competition, the long-term experience of social defeat, defined as a subordinate position or as ‘outsider status’, is a viable candidate. This is compatible with the recent meta-analysis of studies on migrants, which showed greater effect sizes for migrants from developing countries than for those from developed countries, and greater effect sizes for the second generation than for the first. A bigger increase in the second generation is expected, because outsider status would be even more humiliating for individuals who feel entitled to the status conferred by their birthright. Since discrimination would certainly contribute to the migrant’s experience of defeat, it is noteworthy that a prospective study in The Netherlands found that perceived discrimination was a risk factor for the development of psychotic symptoms (Janssen et al, 2003[4]). The risks for immigrant groups known for their strong family networks, for example Asian immigrants to the UK and Turkish immigrants to The Netherlands, are not nearly as high as those for Caribbean immigrants to the UK or Moroccan immigrants to The Netherlands. Moreover, the incidence in minority ethnic groups is smaller when they comprise a greater proportion of the local population (Boydell et al, 2001[5]). A plausible interpretation of these findings is that social support protects against the development of schizophrenia and this accords well with the social defeat hypothesis.

So here we see that discrimination is a causal factor on the one hand, but relying on strong family networks, and having a large number of people of similar cultural origin are protective factors.

In the case study quoted at the start of this blog, it mentions that the author is somewhat of an outsider in their home country. Could they be describing the experiences of a Sunni youth from Iran, where 90-95% of the population is Shi’a? Or maybe a Shi’a youth from Jordan, positioned as it is between Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, where the population is 95% Sunni, and 3-4% Christian?

The “rigorous survey” that was the basis for ‘What British Muslims Really Think’ didn’t actually make a distinction between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. Amongst British Muslims, 85% are Sunni, and 14.8% Shi’a. This approximately reflects worldwide demographics that suggest Sunni are between 75 and 90% of the world’s Muslims, and that 10 to 20% are Shi’a. I’m sure such a failure would not occur in distinguishing Catholics from Protestants, and the different attitudes they hold. Why, if we know that a population’s religious identity is important to them, when we’re trying to advocate active integration, would we then turn around and ignore that identity? It is at least conceivable that the difference between Sunni and Shi’a, as illustrated by the two examples I just gave, could be a part of the reason for emigrating in the first place.

As much as we might try and empathise with someone when they are going through something traumatic, and migration is traumatic, it’s hard to do so when we’ve not ever migrated ourselves. It is even more difficult when the person with whom we are trying to empathise seems radically different to us, and thus the basis for even empathizing – which most of us like to think we’re pretty good at, I’m sure – is just that bit harder. It is an unfortunate truism of the way our brains work that we notice difference first, and have to be reminded of similarity. Those of us who rely more on gut reaction, will therefore, in general, tend to be less empathic towards noticeably different strangers than those who stop and think about the commonalities we nevertheless share as humans.

Let me re-quote what I think is one of the most affecting lines from the case study above – notice the beautiful use of language when, at the same time they are mourning the loss of language. This, in a way, is the power and the shortcoming of words:

“the words … don’t stand for things in the same unquestioned way they did in my native tongue. …This radical disjoining between word and thing is a desiccating alchemy, draining the world not only of significance, but of its colours, striations, nuances – its very existence. It is a loss of a living connection.”

Do you care to guess the specifics of the individual in that case study, the author of those words? In an attempt to illustrate just how universal such things are, I’ve not quoted a Muslim.

 

[Scroll down…]

 

 

[…Have a guess…]

 

 

 

[…Oh, go on…]

 

 

 

 

The subject of that piece, the quotes contained therein written by her as an adult woman, speak of the experiences of a thirteen-year-old Jewish girl moving from Krakow, Poland, to Vancouver, Canada, in 1959.

[Reactions in the comments section, please.]

[1] McGrath, J., Saha, S., Welham, J., El Saadi, O., MacCauley, C., & Chant, D. (2004). A systematic review of the incidence of schizophrenia: the distribution of rates and the influence of sex, urbanicity, migrant status and methodology. BMC medicine, 2(1), 1.

[2] Fearon, P., Kirkbride, J. B., Morgan, C., Dazzan, P., Morgan, K., Lloyd, T., … & Mallett, R. (2006). Incidence of schizophrenia and other psychoses in ethnic minority groups: results from the MRC AESOP Study. Psychological medicine, 36(11), 1541-1550.

[3] Cantor-Graae, E. & Selten, J. P. (2005) Schizophrenia and migration: a meta-analysis and review. American Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 12-  24.

[4] Janssen, I., Hanssen, M., Bak, M., et al (2003) Discrimination and delusional ideation. British Journal of Psychiatry, 182, 71^76.

[5] Boydell, J., van Os, J., McKenzie, K., et al (2001) Incidence of schizophrenia in ethnic minorities in London: ecological study into interactions with the environment. BMJ, 323, 114.

Does anybody really think?, pt. 1

I want to take a closer look at the recent Channel 4 programme ‘What British Muslims Really Think’, now described on My4 as “Trevor Phillips presents the results of a rigorous survey of the views of British Muslims.” To call this survey, or at least this presentation of it, “rigorous”, is overselling it. The language used, in several places, to present the findings is, I think unintentionally, inflammatory. And the description of the methodology leaves me feeling as though there was rather a lot of question-begging going on. What is odd, though, is that the conclusion is, nevertheless, broadly in line with my own sentiments, and so, because of the 45 minute rollercoaster ride to get there, I don’t see how the conclusion follows from the presentation as a whole.

I started writing this piece with the intention of using a quote from a book that looks at neurobiology, ideology, and social change, which seems germane to the problems of integration, but now I will save that for part two. In this first part I will pick through the results, as presented in this documentary, and highlight issues with the methodology, the results, or the presentation thereof. Where applicable I have provided time-stamps for the portion of the documentary that the quote relates to.

After a general introduction to the intent of the documentary, we are advised of some aspects of the methodology used to run the survey that is the basis of it. For example, “ICM decided that the best way to get a fully representative sample of Muslim opinion was to concentrate on areas where at least one fifth of the population is Muslim” (5:11-5:19) and, “ICM interviewed 1081 British Muslim’s face-to-face.” (6:22-6:26). Starting at 8:37 we get our first hint of the results. One third of Muslims think polygamy is acceptable, compared with one tenth of the general public. One-fifth of Muslims (18% actually) think homosexuality should be legal, where as four-fifths of the general public do (it was 73%, actually, and that’s nearer to three quarters, for the purposes of accuracy, clarity, AND brevity). Finally, sympathy for political violence and suicide bombing was 4% in the Muslim population, as compared to 1% in the general population. For a documentary which, in its conclusion talks about integration, to kick off with a very stark ‘Us vs. Them’ presentation of results seem, well, unhelpful.

Martin Boon, Director of ICM, the company that carried out this research, characterises that 1% of the general population as “no more than a handful.” So here we come to our first bit of lazy, and potentially inflammatory presentation, and from the Director of the Company that carried out the research. The Muslim population, in total, is only 4.8% of the total population, and it is 4% of that population that is sympathetic to political violence and suicide bombing. Much mileage was made of the fact that this was something like 100,000 people, but not much mileage was made out of the fact that it was to “fight injustice” (see image below). The thing is, only 1% of the non-Muslim population has this sympathy, and 0.2% of the total population has this sympathy, and is Muslim. So, as presented, four times as many Muslims as “non-Muslims” have these sympathies, but in the context of broader society five times as many “non-Muslims” as Muslims have these sympathies. That’s why the saying ‘Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics’ was coined. Of the 63.2 million people in the UK (as at the last census, 2011), and based on these percentages, there are around 110,000 Muslims who have these sympathies… and 630,000 or so “non-Muslims” who also do.

Screen Shot 2016-04-19 at 16.07.26.png

It’s not so much that Muslims are being stereotyped as suicide bombers, but that suicide bombers are being stereotyped as Muslim. The documentary tells us that a disturbingly large number of Muslims have “some form of sympathy with violent acts”, which is then ramped up to “…sympathize with Islamist terrorism.” OK. What does “sympathy” mean? Can we determine the difference between “violent acts” and “Islamist Terrorism”? The presentation specifically noted that this sympathy was in response to people fighting injustice, but this key motivation to sympathy is missing from the presentation of the results (indeed I only know about the “injustice” bit because it was on screen (above) – it did not rate a mention in the commentary or narration). I’ll come back to the point about what sympathy means later.

We’re then told that 21% of Muslims have been to the home of a non-Muslim only once in the last year, and that another 21% have never been to a non-Muslim’s home. There is a significant problem with this question, and I will quote the documentary to highlight it: “ICM decided that the best way to get a fully representative sample of Muslim opinion was to concentrate on areas where at least one fifth of the population is Muslim” (5:11-5:19). So, people are more inclined to make friends with people that are more like them when they are in areas where they are spoiled for choice? Shocking! Also, is it the Muslims not visiting the non-Muslims, or is it the non-Muslims not inviting the Muslims? There didn’t appear to be a question about whether non-Muslim’s had visited the homes of Muslims. One of the interviewees, Anjum Anwar makes this point forcefully: “So, if you have a child that goes to a school that is wholly Asian, who lives in an areas that is predominantly Asian… Where would that child meet children and people of other faiths? They’re restricted, aren’t they?”

Trevor Phillips then tells us that, “Equality of women, social tolerance, freedom of expression are now all taken for granted as features of the British way of life” (13:57). By contrast, homosexuality should be illegal, according to 52% of British Muslims, compared to 10% of the general population. In other words 1.35 million Muslims have the same beliefs as around six million non-Muslim Britons. That being said Muslims make up 4.8% of the population, and YouGov estimates that homosexuals make up around 6%.

The next question to be addressed was that of anti-Semitism. 35% of Muslims hold at least some anti-Semitic views, as opposed to 9% of the non-Muslim population – that’s around 900,000 Muslims as against more than five million non-Muslim Britons.

A sizable 39% of British Muslims believe that ‘wives should always obey their husbands,’ compared with 5% of non-Muslim Britons, again, vastly more others hold this view than Muslims. At this point the view on polygamy is reiterated. Whilst not polygamy, and certainly not about assuming that women should do what they’re told, polyamory is a small and growing subculture in the UK. There is even a “non-monogamous” option on OKCupid (and you can’t really call it cheating if you’re open about it, which at least implies that polyamory is a big enough deal for OKCupid to have that option). So we have a minority view that many Muslims hold that some non-Muslims might have at least some sympathy with. I don’t want to get sidelined into a discussion about the difference between polyamory and polygamy. Suffice to say that media coverage, such as this one in the Independent, often focuses on one male/two female polyamorous triads – though that might say more about media prurience than about polyamory. What I wanted to introduce was the idea that some people have views that are at least nominally or partially compatible with Muslims, and those people aren’t targeted for having those views, albeit that they are still somewhat fringe at the moment.

Now, let’s look at the statistics about homosexuality in a little more depth. Where only 18% of all Muslims think that Homosexuality should be legal, 28% of British Muslims aged 18-24 agree that Homosexuality should be legal, as compared to 2% of those over 65. Homosexuality was decriminalized in the UK in 1967, so there is no direct comparison to be drawn between modern British attitudes, but it’s probably fair to say that if you’re for the legality of homosexuality, you’re probably pro-same sex marriage (the vice is definitely versa). In a society where Same Sex marriage has been legalized, albeit only in 2013, once someone has made the decision to be for freedom of sexual orientation, they’re now under pressure from broader society to make the relatively short jump to being for the legal recognition of relationships that arise form that orientation. As such, a comparison between a YouGov poll of the general population from mid-May, 2013, with regard to same sex marriage, and views on the legality of homosexuality amongst Muslims may put things in perspective. In this we find that only 54% of non-Muslims support gay marriage, with 37% opposing; amongst Conservative supporters, that drops to 45% in favour, 48% oppose; UKIP supporters swing further still, 38% in support, and 53% opposing.

Ignoring politics for the moment, the sentiments of 18-24 year old Muslims is trending towards that of Britons aged over 60. (I put very approximate reciprocal ‘Oppose’ numbers into the table below, just to illustrate the general trend.) The law enabling same sex marriage, as finally passed, states that no religious organization can be compelled to perform these ceremonies. It’s hard to see how highly religious Muslims are failing to fit in to British society, therefore.

SAME SEX MARRIAGE Lib. Dem. Labour Conservative UKIP
Support 72 57 45 38
Oppose 24 31 48 53
UK (60+) UK (40-59) UK (25-39) UK (18-24)
Support 28 58 70 74
Oppose 63 32 21 17
 Legal Homosexuality Muslim: 18-24 65+
Support 28 2
Oppose ~70 ~95

 

Now, consider that in times of high stress, uncertainty, and instability, people become more religious (Hogg, Kruglanski & Bos, 2013; Paul, 2009), and less reliant on government (Kay, Shepherd, Blatz & Chua, 2010). See also Gregory Paul’s further work related to his Successful Societies Scale. Consider, also that strong religiosity is linked to more conservative political views (Altemeyer, 2006). Additionally, note that Muslim families are almost twice as likely to have small children as the general population (whilst Muslims are 4.8% of the overall population, 8.1% of all school-age children are Muslim). There is also a very strong link with parenting and conservative views (Altemeyer, 2006; Hohman, 2015), which must link, at least in part, to the high stress and uncertainty mentioned above.

One can expect certain behaviours in line with heightened religiosity, we see it in the US, but we’ve been (mostly) spared it here in the UK. According to the survey, 18% of British Muslim’s sympathize with violence against those who mock the prophet. There’s that word “sympathize” again. Although, how you sympathize with violence, I’m not sure. You might sympathize with people who commit violence in the service of fighting injustice… but another question arises, how did the person answering the question perceive “mockery”? Whilst we’re noticing the religiousness of Muslims it’s appropriate to point out that the blasphemy law was only struck from the books, in the UK, in 2008. How quickly we forget, and get self-righteous about our newly enlightened position.

Speaking of hypocrisy and stereotypes, Martin Boon, tells us that only 2/3 of Muslim’s condemn stoning for adultery, compared to nearly all members of the general British public. This of course is a problem. Meanwhile, the 40+% of the population who claim to adhere to some form Christianity believe in the importance of a book that advocates the exact same thing. If there were any instances of this being carried out in the UK it is even further back in history than the abolition of the blasphemy law. How fortunate! Unfortunately, section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which came into law in October of 2010, allows infidelity to be used as a defense for murder (see Horder & Fitz-Gibbon, 2015, for a discussion of the impact of this law). So, again, where’s the vast chasm of differing attitudes?

The tone of the presentation gets worse at 25:55:

“It’s clear that I, and many others involved in the policy-making field just got the aspirations of British Muslims wrong. Our mistake was to imagine that because historically other minority communities – Hindus and Sikhs, for example – had gradually moved to adopt some of the behaviours of the majority, that Muslims would follow the same pattern. But our survey suggests significant number of British Muslims don’t want to change, and don’t want to move to adopt the behaviours of the majority. … Many British Muslims would rather that non Muslim Britain changed its ways to accommodate their way of life.”

There are so many things wrong with this. But they can all be summed up by pointing out that there are many significant differences between the histories of the relationships between the English and Hindus and Sikhs, as compared to that between the English and Muslims. English occupation of Hindu and Sikh territories mostly ended quite a while ago. And whilst the echoes of empire are doubtless still felt in those places, the impact of British colonialism, and British support of US programmes of interventionist politics in the Middle East and Pakistan, and an illegal war or two, may have more than a little influence on Muslim sympathies with their countrymen (and women), and may well have influence on who has fled those countries to come to Britain. I am not a historian, so I don’t want to get caught up in a long discussion about the history of the region that was home to so many of the Muslims that now live in the UK, whether in this generation, or generations past. I’m not a statistician, either, but I think the statistics that this documentary set out to present need some context and balance, so here goes…

British Hindus and Sikhs, combined, are half the total numbers of British Muslims, and so are less likely to have that many communities where they make up 20% or more of the local population. According to the 2011 census, half of all British Hindus live in London. In other words, 400,000 Hindus live in a city of around eight million. So in London, Hindus make up around 5% of the population, on a par with the overall population of Muslims in the UK.

Year Hindu Growth Sikh Growth Muslim Growth
1961 30,000 16,000 50,000
1971 138,000 360.0% 72,000 350.0% 226,000 352.0%
1981 278,000 101.4% 144,000 100.0% 553,000 144.7%
1991 397,000 42.8% 206,000 43.1% 950,000 71.8%
2001 559,000 40.8% 340,000 65.0% 1,600,000 68.4%
2011 817,000 46.2% 423,000 24.4% 2,707,000 69.2%

According to the 2011 census the London boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, Redbridge, Waltham Forest, Brent, Enfield, Ealing, and Haringey, along with the City of Westminster, were home to the majority of Muslims in London. These are the areas in London that were amongst the top 20 for the largest Muslim populations, per capita, as at 2011. As such this is a good shortlist for the communities selected by ICM for this survey. They total 581,997. Along with smaller populations around London, Muslims make up 12.4% of the population (and Londoners account for 40% of the UK’s Muslims). That is starkly different to the 50% of British Hindus that make up 5% of the London population. So why are we surprised that Muslims have a different social trajectory? Especially given the recent socio-psychological and geopolitical issues that relate to that movement, much of which is ongoing.

The implication from Phillips’ comment is that policy-makers were surprised when a population that is between two and six times the size of the reference population(s) didn’t behave in the same way. Muslim population growth is taking much longer to regress to the general population’s mean. Between 2001 and 2011 population growth in the UK was around 7%. Without Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, it drops to 4.8%. Not only is the Muslim population itself more than double that of the reference groups (see table below where “Both” is Hindu and Sikh combined), but Muslim population growth is almost double, too (33% of the Muslim population was aged 15 years or under in 2011, compared to 19% of the population as a whole). This makes a very strong case for educating our policymakers in statistics and demography or, I don’t know, actually using the ONS to interpret statistics for policy decisions.

Year Both Growth Muslim Growth
1961 46,000 50,000
1971 210,000 356.5% 226,000 352.0%
1981 422,000 101.0% 553,000 144.7%
1991 603,000 42.9% 950,000 71.8%
2001 899,000 49.1% 1,600,000 68.4%
2011 1,240,000 37.9% 2,707,000 69.2%

A strong thread throughout this ”documentary” is the concern about the lack of integration, and the ‘us vs. them’ mentality that arises from, and is strengthened by, this lack of integration (ironically not helped by the presentation to this point). But sometimes it was the very fact of adopting a British attitude that was demonised, a kind of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ dichotomy. At 33:11 we get this gem:

“…’live and let live’ is probably the most commonly accepted expression of British tolerance. Usually accompanied with a sort of ‘well, what can you do?’ shrug. But, there is a problem with this ‘live and let live’ laissez-faire approach: our survey revealed that the more people hankered after a separate life the more sympathetic they were to violence and extremism, and that really does matter. … When it came to exploring attitudes to violence, the survey asked British Muslims what actions they would take if they knew someone who was involved with supporting terrorism in Syria. Just 1/3, 34% said they would report it to the police. There may be several reasons for not shopping would-be jihadists… one, of course, is that you might be sympathetic to their cause.”

I find this reasonable-sounding “several reasons” followed by the less reasonable “one, of course, is that you might be sympathetic to their cause” to be inflammatory, and the sort of thing one expects from Fox “News”. According to this version, your average Muslim is supposed to live and let live, except where it comes to other Muslims having sympathies for terrorism. Which seems fair enough, on the face of it, but given the conflation of Muslims with terrorism in popular conception (only increased by this very presentation), Muslims also have a pretty strong motivation to not say anything, and to hope that they’re wrong about the suspected terrorist sympathizer, in order that the stereotype not be perpetuated, and that they be not personally associated with it. Additionally, and problematic for the validity of this survey, “terrorism IN Syria,” which is what the question asked about, is very different from terrorism in general. Syria has a dictator, and insurgents backed by numerous world powers. In Syria, terrorism is about the only means that some people have to fight back, caught between the oppressive regime of their own government, and the oppressive insurgence of someone else’s utopian dream of a Caliphate, supported by various vested interests in an international proxy war.

I have pointed out the use of the root word “sympathy” a number of times. Martin Boon, addresses this, saying, “There is no right or wrong of measuring sentiment on the use of violence, but we decided to use the word sympathy – the expression of sympathy toward violent questions or sensitivities – as the best way of dealing with it, because it has been used in similar surveys.”

The primary meaning of sympathy, according to that most British of institutions, the Oxford English Dictionary, is, “Feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else’s misfortune”, the secondary definition is “Understanding between people; common feeling”, but the survey seems to be using the third, and thus least used, meaning – “The state or fact of responding in a way similar or corresponding to an action elsewhere.” The usage may possibly be a conflation of one or other of the first two with this last definition. Asking about “sympathy” which, by its common usage, people take to mean “Feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else’s misfortune” and using the alternative definition – “The state or fact of responding in a way similar or corresponding to an action elsewhere” – as a lens through which to interpret the results, is begging the question – not a good thing in a “rigorous survey.”

 

“What we do know from the survey is that Muslim’s who have sympathy for violence are significantly more likely to hold illiberal on issues like gay rights, and women’s equality than those who don’t. So what the survey is showing us is the emergence of what you might describe as a nation within the nation. Where many hold very different values and behaviours from the majority. I’d say that hardly anybody wants to see that happen, but the question is what are we going to do about it?” (37:05-37:37)

 

How do you hold a behaviour? A behaviour is, most often, a course of action predicated on a value. You can actually hold a value, you know, like ‘justice.’ This comment seems to be indicative of an underlying bias in the reporting of these results. Holding different values isn’t necessarily bad, and it’s not always easy to know what a person’s values are. But behaviour? Behaving differently is much easier to portray as bad – the use of the word here just seems to add to the bias apparent through-out this presentation. I’ve repeatedly illustrated that many other Britons hold similar views to Muslims, and in greater numbers, they’re just a little harder to pick on, demographically.

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown then makes an extremely important point, one that, in combination with my point about the socio-psychology and geopolitical realities of Muslim immigration, is the crux of the matter:

“Increasingly – and this really interests me – I’m getting young Muslims writing to me who hate the lives they’re living. They hate it. Some of them are gay. Some of them – men and women – have been forced into marriages. Some of them are lost, because they feel no affinity to anything or anybody, ‘cause they’ve never been allowed to. Yu know, it’ just this thing about being a Muslim – one of them said to me, ‘I am a Muslim, but I am so much more than that.’” (39:01-39:34)

 

Phillips’ narration continues:

“Those of us who are not Muslims shouldn’t be telling those who are how to live their lives or how to meet the needs of their faith. And nobody likes the old idea of assimilation where people abandon their cultural identity in order to blend in to some kind of mainstream. But that doesn’t mean we do nothing. Many people, including me, believe that we can create a set of policies that promote integration, make clear that there are some things on which the society will not compromise, and would support liberal trends in all parts of society. We call it a policy of active integration” (39:57-40:37).

 

I won’t directly quote the next segment, but it suggests that desegregating schools such that no ethnic group can be more than 50% of the roll would be a swift and decisive means to increasing everybody’s exposure to each other. This is “active integration,” and it seems to be working well in one school in Oldham where it was tried. Finally! Something I can wholeheartedly agree with! It only took 40 minutes.

So, Phillips closes with:

“Britain faces a huge challenge: adopting a policy of active integration may give rise to some ideas that make you, me, Muslims, non-Muslims, everyone, feel pretty uncomfortable. But what is our choice? We could cross our fingers, close our eyes, and hope that the segregation, the tensions, the periodic outrages, and the backlash that follows will, somehow, simply vanish. Or, we could seize the initiative; take steps to support those Muslims who do want their communities to change – in their attitudes towards women, towards lesbian and gay people and, indeed, towards violence. I know which of those I would choose. A policy of active integration must be the first step on the path towards those shared values that will come to define what it means to be British, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.” (45:45-46:42)

 

I’m honestly flabbergasted that a documentary that spent so much time misrepresenting statistics about Muslims, ignoring the very real socio-psychological and geopolitical realities of the Muslim diaspora, nevertheless came to an appropriate conclusion. I get the strong impression that the entire thing was an exercise in promoting “active integration,” which is just a new name for an old idea (as far I’m concerned). I’m aware that multi-culturalism has come to mean a kind of segregated coexistence of peoples (i.e. a kinder, gentler apartheid), and it is that multi-culturalism that the pundits tell us has failed. But the multi-culturalism I adhere to, which is no doubt coloured by my being raised in New Zealand, is the one where people share spaces, and their ideas and traditions with each other, as openly as their personalities allow. So, apparently that is called Active Integration, now, in the UK at least.

So, having dealt with significant issues of statistics, context, and bad journalism/sloppy presentation, my next post on this documentary, which will be much shorter, is going to simply look at the issue of integration from the point of view of developmental psychology, neurobiology, ideology, and social change. The general idea being that no-one will be hurt by having a better, more empathic understanding of what it’s like to change countries, and how that change impacts the individual.